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## Session Authorization Policy Element

### Status of this Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

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### Abstract

This document describes the representation of a session authorization policy element for supporting policy-based per-session authorization and admission control. The goal of session authorization is to allow the exchange of information between network elements in order to authorize the use of resources for a service and to co-ordinate actions between the signaling and transport planes. This document describes how a process on a system authorizes the reservation of resources by a host and then provides that host with a session authorization policy element which can be inserted into a resource reservation protocol (e.g., the Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) PATH message) to facilitate proper and secure reservation of those resources within the network. We describe the encoding of session authorization information as a policy element conforming to the format of a Policy Data object (RFC 2750) and provide details relating to operations, processing rules and error scenarios.

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## 1. Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [RFC-2119].

## 2. Introduction

RSVP [RFC-2205] is one example of a resource reservation protocol that is used by a host to request specific services from the network for particular application data streams or flows. RSVP requests will generally result in resources being reserved in each router along the data path. RSVP allows users to obtain preferential access to network resources, under the control of an admission control mechanism. Such admission control is often based on user or application identity [RFC-3182], however, it is also valuable to provide the ability for per-session admission control.

In order to allow for per-session admission control, it is necessary to provide a mechanism for ensuring use of resources by a host has been properly authorized before allowing the reservation of those resources. In order to meet this requirement, there must be information in the resource reservation message which may be used to verify the validity of the reservation request. This can be done by providing the host with a session authorization policy element which is inserted into the resource reservation message and verified by the network.

This document describes the session authorization policy element (AUTH\_SESSION) used to convey information about the resources authorized for use by a session. The host must obtain an AUTH\_SESSION element from an authorizing entity via a session signaling protocol such as SIP [RFC-3261]. The host then inserts the AUTH\_SESSION element into the resource reservation message to allow verification of the network resource request; in the case of RSVP, this element MUST be encapsulated in the Policy Data object [RFC-2750] of an RSVP PATH message. Network elements verify the request and then process the resource reservation message based on admission policy.

[RFC-3521] describes a framework in which a session authorization policy element may be utilized to contain information relevant to the network's decision to grant a reservation request.

### 3. Policy Element for Session Authorization

#### 3.1 Policy Data Object Format

The Session Authorization policy element conforms to the format of a POLICY\_DATA object which contains policy information and is carried by policy based admission protocols such as RSVP. A detailed description of the POLICY\_DATA object can be found in "RSVP Extensions for Policy Control" [RFC-2750].

#### 3.2 Session Authorization Policy Element

In this section we describe a policy element (PE) called session authorization (AUTH\_SESSION). The AUTH\_SESSION policy element contains a list of fields which describe the session, along with other attributes.

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length                               | P-Type = AUTH_SESSION      |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
// Session Authorization Attribute List                                //
+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

Length: 16 bits

The length of the policy element (including the Length and P-Type) is in number of octets (MUST be in multiples of 4) and indicates the end of the session authorization information block.

P-Type: 16 bits (Session Authorization Type)

AUTH\_SESSION = 0x04

The Policy element type (P-type) of this element. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) acts as a registry for policy element types as described in [RFC-2750].

Session Authorization Attribute List: variable length

The session authorization attribute list is a collection of objects which describes the session and provides other information necessary to verify the resource reservation request. An initial set of valid objects is described in Section 3.3.

#### 3.3 Session Authorization Attributes

A session authorization attribute may contain a variety of information and has both an attribute type and subtype. The attribute itself MUST be a multiple of 4 octets in length, and any attributes that are not a multiple of 4 octets long MUST be padded to a 4-octet boundary. All padding bytes MUST have a value of zero.

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length           | X-Type | SubType |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Value ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

Length: 16 bits

The length field is two octets and indicates the actual length of the attribute (including Length, X-Type and SubType fields) in number of octets. The length does NOT include any bytes padding to the value field to make the attribute a multiple of 4 octets long.

X-Type: 8 bits

Session authorization attribute type (X-Type) field is one octet. IANA acts as a registry for X-Types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following X-Types:

- |   |                     |   |
|---|---------------------|---|
| 1 | AUTH_ENT_ID         | The unique identifier of the entity which authorized the session. |
| 2 | SESSION_ID          | Unique identifier for this session.                               |
| 3 | SOURCE_ADDR         | Address specification for the session originator.                 |
| 4 | DEST_ADDR           | Address specification for the session end-point.                  |
| 5 | START_TIME          | The starting time for the session.                                |
| 6 | END_TIME            | The end time for the session.                                     |
| 7 | RESOURCES           | The resources which the user is authorized to request.            |
| 8 | AUTHENTICATION_DATA | Authentication data of the session authorization policy element.  |

SubType: 8 bits

Session authorization attribute sub-type is one octet in length. The value of the SubType depends on the X-Type.

Value: variable length

The attribute specific information.

### 3.3.1 Authorizing Entity Identifier

AUTH\_ENT\_ID is used to identify the entity which authorized the initial service request and generated the session authorization policy element. The AUTH\_ENT\_ID may be represented in various formats, and the SubType is used to define the format for the ID. The format for AUTH\_ENT\_ID is as follows:

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length           |X-Type |SubType|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| OctetString ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

#### Length

Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.

#### X-Type

AUTH\_ENT\_ID

#### SubType

The following sub-types for AUTH\_ENT\_ID are defined. IANA acts as a registry for AUTH\_ENT\_ID sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub-types of AUTH\_ENT\_ID:

- |   |               |   |
|---|---------------|---|
| 1 | IPV4_ADDRESS  | IPv4 address represented in 32 bits   |
| 2 | IPV6_ADDRESS  | IPv6 address represented in 128 bits  |
| 3 | FQDN          | Fully Qualified Domain Name as defined in RFC 1034 as an ASCII string.  |
| 4 | ASCII_DN      | X.500 Distinguished name as defined in RFC 2253 as an ASCII string.   |
| 5 | UNICODE_DN    | X.500 Distinguished name as defined in RFC 2253 as a UTF-8 string.  |
| 6 | URI           | Universal Resource Identifier, as defined in RFC 2396.  |
| 7 | KRB_PRINCIPAL | Fully Qualified Kerberos Principal name represented by the ASCII string of a principal followed by the @ realm name as defined in RFC 1510 (e.g., principalX@realmY). |

- 8 X509\_V3\_CERT           The Distinguished Name of the subject of the certificate as defined in RFC 2253 as a UTF-8 string.
- 9 PGP\_CERT               The PGP digital certificate of the authorizing entity as defined in RFC 2440.

OctetString

Contains the authorizing entity identifier.

### 3.3.2 Session Identifier

SESSION\_ID is a unique identifier used by the authorizing entity to identify the request. It may be used for a number of purposes, including replay detection, or to correlate this request to a policy decision entry made by the authorizing entity. For example, the SESSION\_ID can be based on simple sequence numbers or on a standard NTP timestamp.

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length           |X-Type |SubType|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| OctetString ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
```

Length

Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.

X-Type

SESSION\_ID

SubType

No subtypes for SESSION\_ID are currently defined; this field MUST be set to zero. The authorizing entity is the only network entity that needs to interpret the contents of the SESSION\_ID therefore the contents and format are implementation dependent.

OctetString

Contains the session identifier.

### 3.3.3 Source Address

SOURCE\_ADDR is used to identify the source address specification of the authorized session. This X-Type may be useful in some scenarios to make sure the resource request has been authorized for that particular source address and/or port.

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length           |X-Type |SubType|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| OctetString ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

**Length**

Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.

**X-Type**

SOURCE\_ADDR

**SubType**

The following sub types for SOURCE\_ADDR are defined. IANA acts as a registry for SOURCE\_ADDR sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub types for SOURCE\_ADDR:

- |   |               |  |
|---|---------------|--|
| 1 | IPV4_ADDRESS  | IPv4 address represented in 32 bits  |
| 2 | IPV6_ADDRESS  | IPv6 address represented in 128 bits                                       |
| 3 | UDP_PORT_LIST | list of UDP port specifications,<br>represented as 16 bits per list entry. |
| 4 | TCP_PORT_LIST | list of TCP port specifications,<br>represented as 16 bits per list entry. |

**OctetString**

The OctetString contains the source address information.

In scenarios where a source address is required (see Section 5), at least one of the subtypes 1 through 2 (inclusive) MUST be included in every Session Authorization Data Policy Element. Multiple SOURCE\_ADDR attributes MAY be included if multiple addresses have been authorized. The source address field of the resource reservation datagram (e.g., RSVP PATH) MUST match one of the SOURCE\_ADDR attributes contained in this Session Authorization Data Policy Element.

At most, one instance of subtype 3 MAY be included in every Session Authorization Data Policy Element. At most, one instance of subtype 4 MAY be included in every Session Authorization Data Policy Element. Inclusion of a subtype 3 attribute does not prevent inclusion of a subtype 4 attribute (i.e., both UDP and TCP ports may be authorized).

If no PORT attributes are specified, then all ports are considered valid; otherwise, only the specified ports are authorized for use.



Every source address and port list must be included in a separate SOURCE\_ADDR attribute.

### 3.3.4 Destination Address

DEST\_ADDR is used to identify the destination address of the authorized session. This X-Type may be useful in some scenarios to make sure the resource request has been authorized for that particular destination address and/or port.

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length           |X-Type |SubType|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| OctetString ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

#### Length

Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.

#### X-Type

DEST\_ADDR

#### SubType

The following sub types for DEST\_ADDR are defined. IANA acts as a registry for DEST\_ADDR sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub types for DEST\_ADDR:

- |   |               |  |
|---|---------------|--|
| 1 | IPV4_ADDRESS  | IPv4 address represented in 32 bits  |
| 2 | IPV6_ADDRESS  | IPv6 address represented in 128 bits                                       |
| 3 | UDP_PORT_LIST | list of UDP port specifications,<br>represented as 16 bits per list entry. |
| 4 | TCP_PORT_LIST | list of TCP port specifications,<br>represented as 16 bits per list entry. |

#### OctetString

The OctetString contains the destination address specification.

In scenarios where a destination address is required (see Section 5), at least one of the subtypes 1 through 2 (inclusive) MUST be included in every Session Authorization Data Policy Element. Multiple DEST\_ADDR attributes MAY be included if multiple addresses have been authorized. The destination address field of the resource

reservation datagram (e.g., RSVP PATH) MUST match one of the DEST\_ADDR attributes contained in this Session Authorization Data Policy Element.

At most, one instance of subtype 3 MAY be included in every Session Authorization Data Policy Element. At most, one instance of subtype 4 MAY be included in every Session Authorization Data Policy Element. Inclusion of a subtype 3 attribute does not prevent inclusion of a subtype 4 attribute (i.e., both UDP and TCP ports may be authorized).

If no PORT attributes are specified, then all ports are considered valid; otherwise, only the specified ports are authorized for use.

Every destination address and port list must be included in a separate DEST\_ADDR attribute.

### 3.3.5 Start time

START\_TIME is used to identify the start time of the authorized session and can be used to prevent replay attacks. If the AUTH\_SESSION policy element is presented in a resource request, the network SHOULD reject the request if it is not received within a few seconds of the start time specified.

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length           |X-Type |SubType|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| OctetString ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

#### Length

Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.

#### X-Type

START\_TIME

#### SubType

The following sub types for START\_TIME are defined. IANA acts as a registry for START\_TIME sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub types for START\_TIME:

1	NTP_TIMESTAMP	NTP Timestamp Format as defined in RFC 1305.
---	---------------	--

#### OctetString

The OctetString contains the start time.

### 3.3.6 End time

END\_TIME is used to identify the end time of the authorized session and can be used to limit the amount of time that resources are authorized for use (e.g., in prepaid session scenarios).

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length           |X-Type |SubType|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| OctetString ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

#### Length

Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.

#### X-Type

END\_TIME

#### SubType

The following sub types for END\_TIME are defined. IANA acts as a registry for END\_TIME sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub types for END\_TIME:

1	NTP_TIMESTAMP	NTP Timestamp Format as defined in RFC 1305.
---	---------------	--

#### OctetString

The OctetString contains the end time.

### 3.3.7 Resources Authorized

RESOURCES is used to define the characteristics of the authorized session. This X-Type may be useful in some scenarios to specify the specific resources authorized to ensure the request fits the authorized specifications.

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length           |X-Type |SubType|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| OctetString ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

#### Length

Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.

#### X-Type

RESOURCES

### SubType

The following sub-types for RESOURCES are defined. IANA acts as a registry for RESOURCES sub-types as described in section 7, IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following sub types for RESOURCES:

- |   |           |   |
|---|-----------|---|
| 1 | BANDWIDTH | Maximum bandwidth (kbps) authorized.                      |
| 2 | FLOW_SPEC | Flow spec specification as defined in RFC 2205.           |
| 3 | SDP       | SDP Media Descriptor as defined in RFC 2327.              |
| 4 | DSCP      | Differentiated services codepoint as defined in RFC 2474. |

### OctetString

The OctetString contains the resources specification.

In scenarios where a resource specification is required (see Section 5), at least one of the subtypes 1 through 4 (inclusive) MUST be included in every Session Authorization Data Policy Element. Multiple RESOURCE attributes MAY be included if multiple types of resources have been authorized (e.g., DSCP and BANDWIDTH).

### 3.3.8 Authentication data

The AUTHENTICATION\_DATA attribute contains the authentication data of the AUTH\_SESSION policy element and signs all the data in the policy element up to the AUTHENTICATION\_DATA. If the AUTHENTICATION\_DATA attribute has been included in the AUTH\_SESSION policy element, it MUST be the last attribute in the list. The algorithm used to compute the authentication data depends on the AUTH\_ENT\_ID SubType field. See Section 4 entitled Integrity of the AUTH\_SESSION policy element.

A summary of AUTHENTICATION\_DATA attribute format is described below.

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length           |X-Type |SubType|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| OctetString ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
```

#### Length

Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.

#### X-Type

AUTHENTICATION\_DATA

**SubType**

No sub types for AUTHENTICATION\_DATA are currently defined. This field MUST be set to 0.

**OctetString**

The OctetString contains the authentication data of the AUTH\_SESSION.

#### 4. Integrity of the AUTH\_SESSION policy element

This section describes how to ensure the integrity of the policy element is preserved.

##### 4.1 Shared symmetric keys

In shared symmetric key environments, the AUTH\_ENT\_ID MUST be of subtypes: IPV4\_ADDRESS, IPV6\_ADDRESS, FQDN, ASCII\_DN, UNICODE\_DN or URI. An example AUTH\_SESSION policy element is shown below.

+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Length	P-type = AUTH_SESSION		
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Length	SESSION_ID	zero	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
OctetString (The session identifier) ...			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Length	AUTH_ENT_ID	IPV4_ADDRESS	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
OctetString (The authorizing entity's Identifier) ...			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Length	AUTH DATA.	zero	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
KEY_ID			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
OctetString (Authentication data) ...			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			

##### 4.1.1 Operational Setting using shared symmetric keys

This assumes both the Authorizing Entity and the Network router/PDP are provisioned with shared symmetric keys and with policies detailing which algorithm to be used for computing the authentication data along with the expected length of the authentication data for that particular algorithm.

Key maintenance is outside the scope of this document, but AUTH\_SESSION implementations MUST at least provide the ability to manually configure keys and their parameters locally. The key used

to produce the authentication data is identified by the AUTH\_ENT\_ID field. Since multiple keys may be configured for a particular AUTH\_ENT\_ID value, the first 32 bits of the AUTH\_DATA field MUST be a key ID to be used to identify the appropriate key. Each key must also be configured with lifetime parameters for the time period within which it is valid as well as an associated cryptographic algorithm parameter specifying the algorithm to be used with the key. At a minimum, all AUTH\_SESSION implementations MUST support the HMAC-MD5-128 [RFC-2104], [RFC-1321] cryptographic algorithm for computing the authentication data. New algorithms may be added by the IETF standards process.

It is good practice to regularly change keys. Keys MUST be configurable such that their lifetimes overlap allowing smooth transitions between keys. At the midpoint of the lifetime overlap between two keys, senders should transition from using the current key to the next/longer-lived key. Meanwhile, receivers simply accept any identified key received within its configured lifetime and reject those that are not.

## 4.2 Kerberos

In a Kerberos environment, the AUTH\_ENT\_ID MUST be of the subtype KRB\_PRINCIPAL. The KRB\_PRINCIPAL field is defined as the Fully Qualified Kerberos Principal name of the authorizing entity. Kerberos [RFC-1510] authentication uses a trusted third party (the Kerberos Distribution Center - KDC) to provide for authentication of the AUTH\_SESSION to a network server. It is assumed that a KDC is present and both host and verifier of authentication information (authorizing entity and router/PDP) implement Kerberos authentication.

An example of the Kerberos AUTH\_DATA policy element is shown below.

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length                               | P-type = AUTH_SESSION          |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length                               | SESSION_ID                     | zero                             |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| OctetString (The session identifier) ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length                               | AUTH_ENT_ID                    | KERB_P.                         |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| OctetString (The principal@realm name) ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

#### 4.2.1. Operational Setting using Kerberos

An authorizing entity is configured to construct the AUTH\_SESSION policy element that designates use of the Kerberos authentication method (KRB\_PRINCIPAL) as defined in RFC 1510. Upon reception of the resource reservation request, the router/PDP contacts the local KDC, with a KRB\_AS\_REQ message, to request credentials for the authorizing entity (principal@realm). In this request, the client (router/PDP) sends (in cleartext) its own identity and the identity of the server (the authorizing entity taken from the AUTH\_ENT\_ID field) for which it is requesting credentials. The local KDC responds with these credentials in a KRB\_AS\_REP message, encrypted in the client's key. The credentials consist of 1) a "ticket" for the server and 2) a temporary encryption key (often called a "session key"). The router/PDP uses the ticket to access the authorizing entity with a KRB\_AP\_REQ message. The session key (now shared by the router/PDP and the authorizing entity) is used to authenticate the router/PDP, and is used to authenticate the authorizing entity. The session key is an encryption key and is also used to encrypt further communication between the two parties. The authorizing entity responds by sending a concatenated message of a KRB\_AP\_REP and a KRB\_SAFE. The KRB\_AP\_REP is used to authenticate the authorizing entity. The KRB\_SAFE message contains the authentication data in the safe-body field. The authentication data must be either a 16 byte MD5 hash or 20 byte SHA-1 hash of all data in the AUTH\_SESSION policy element up to the AUTHENTICATION\_DATA (note that when using Kerberos the AUTH\_SESSION PE should not include AUTHENTICATION\_DATA as this is sent in the KRB\_SAFE message). The router/PDP independently computes the hash, and compares it with the received hash in the user-data field of the KRB-SAFE-BODY [RFC-1510].

At a minimum, all AUTH\_SESSION implementations using Kerberos MUST support the Kerberos des-cbc-md5 encryption type [RFC-1510] (for encrypted data in tickets and Kerberos messages) and the Kerberos rsa-md5-des checksum type [RFC-1510] (for the KRB\_SAFE checksum) checksum. New algorithms may be added by the IETF standards process. Triple-DES encryption is supported in many Kerberos implementations (although not specified in [RFC-1510]), and SHOULD be used over single DES.

For cases where the authorizing entity is in a different realm (i.e., administrative domain, organizational boundary), the router/PDP needs to fetch a cross-realm Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) from its local KDC. This TGT can be used to fetch authorizing entity tickets from the KDC in the remote realm. Note that for performance considerations, tickets are typically cached for extended periods.

### 4.3 Public Key

In a public key environment, the AUTH\_ENT\_ID MUST be of the subtypes: X509\_V3\_CERT or PGP\_CERT. The authentication data is used for authenticating the authorizing entity. An example of the public key AUTH\_SESSION policy element is shown below.

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length                               | P-type = AUTH_SESSION |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length                               | SESSION_ID            | zero                  |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| OctetString (The session identifier) ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length                               | AUTH_ENT_ID           | PGP_CERT             |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| OctetString (Authorizing entity Digital Certificate) ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Length                               | AUTH DATA.           | zero                  |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| OctetString (Authentication data) ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

#### 4.3.1. Operational Setting for public key based authentication

Public key based authentication assumes the following:

- Authorizing entities have a pair of keys (private key and public key).
- Private key is secured with the authorizing entity.
- Public keys are stored in digital certificates and a trusted party, certificate authority (CA) issues these digital certificates.
- The verifier (PDP or router) has the ability to verify the digital certificate.

Authorizing entity uses its private key to generate AUTHENTICATION\_DATA. Authenticators (router, PDP) use the authorizing entity's public key (stored in the digital certificate) to verify and authenticate the policy element.



#### 4.3.1.1 X.509 V3 digital certificates

When the AUTH\_ENT\_ID is of type X509\_V3\_CERT, AUTHENTICATION\_DATA MUST be generated following these steps:

- A Signed-data is constructed as defined in section 5 of CMS [RFC-3369]. A digest is computed on the content (as specified in section 6.1) with a signer-specific message-digest algorithm. The certificates field contains the chain of authorizing entity's X.509 V3 digital certificates. The certificate revocation list is defined in the crls field. The digest output is digitally signed following section 8 of RFC 3447, using the signer's private key.

When the AUTH\_ENT\_ID is of type X509\_V3\_CERT, verification MUST be done following these steps:

- Parse the X.509 V3 certificate to extract the distinguished name of the issuer of the certificate.
- Certification Path Validation is performed as defined in section 6 of RFC 3280.
- Parse through the Certificate Revocation list to verify that the received certificate is not listed.
- Once the X.509 V3 certificate is validated, the public key of the authorizing entity can be extracted from the certificate.
- Extract the digest algorithm and the length of the digested data by parsing the CMS signed-data.
- The recipient independently computes the message digest. This message digest and the signer's public key are used to verify the signature value.

This verification ensures integrity, non-repudiation and data origin.

#### 4.3.1.2 PGP digital certificates

When the AUTH\_ENT\_ID is of type PGP\_CERT, AUTHENTICATION\_DATA MUST be generated following these steps:

- AUTHENTICATION\_DATA contains a Signature Packet as defined in section 5.2.3 of RFC 2440. In summary:
  - Compute the hash of all data in the AUTH\_SESSION policy element up to the AUTHENTICATION\_DATA.
  - The hash output is digitally signed following section 8 of RFC 3447, using the signer's private key.

When the AUTH\_ENT\_ID is of type PGP\_CERT, verification MUST be done following these steps:

- Validate the certificate.
- Once the PGP certificate is validated, the public key of the authorizing entity can be extracted from the certificate.
- Extract the hash algorithm and the length of the hashed data by parsing the PGP signature packet.
- The recipient independently computes the message digest. This message digest and the signer's public key are used to verify the signature value.

This verification ensures integrity, non-repudiation and data origin.

## 5. Framework

[RFC-3521] describes a framework in which the AUTH\_SESSION policy element may be utilized to transport information required for authorizing resource reservation for media flows. [RFC-3521] introduces 4 different models:

- 1- the coupled model
- 2- the associated model with one policy server
- 3- the associated model with two policy servers
- 4- the non-associated model.

The fields that are required in an AUTH\_SESSION policy element dependent on which of the models is used.

### 5.1 The coupled model

In the Coupled Model, the only information that MUST be included in the policy element is the SESSION\_ID; it is used by the Authorizing Entity to correlate the resource reservation request with the media authorized during session set up. Since the End Host is assumed to be untrusted, the Policy Server SHOULD take measures to ensure that the integrity of the SESSION\_ID is preserved in transit; the exact mechanisms to be used and the format of the SESSION\_ID are implementation dependent.

### 5.2 The associated model with one policy server

In this model, the contents of the AUTH\_SESSION policy element MUST include:

- A session identifier - SESSION\_ID. This is information that the authorizing entity can use to correlate the resource reservation request with the media authorized during session set up.

- The identity of the authorizing entity - AUTH\_ENT\_ID. This information is used by the Edge Router to determine which authorizing entity (Policy Server) should be used to solicit resource policy decisions.

In some environments, an Edge Router may have no means for determining if the identity refers to a legitimate Policy Server within its domain. In order to protect against redirection of authorization requests to a bogus authorizing entity, the AUTH\_SESSION MUST also include:

- AUTHENTICATION\_DATA. This authentication data is calculated over all other fields of the AUTH\_SESSION policy element.

### 5.3 The associated model with two policy servers

The content of the AUTH\_SESSION Policy Element is identical to the associated model with one policy server.

### 5.4 The non-associated model

In this model, the AUTH\_SESSION MUST contain sufficient information to allow the Policy Server to make resource policy decisions autonomously from the authorizing entity. The policy element is created using information about the session by the authorizing entity. The information in the AUTH\_SESSION policy element MUST include:

- Calling party IP address or Identity (e.g., FQDN) - SOURCE\_ADDR X-TYPE
- Called party IP address or Identity (e.g., FQDN) - DEST\_ADDR X-TYPE
- The characteristics of (each of) the media stream(s) authorized for this session - RESOURCES X-TYPE
- The authorization lifetime - START\_TIME X-TYPE
- The identity of the authorizing entity to allow for validation of the token in shared symmetric key and Kerberos schemes - AUTH\_ENT\_ID X-TYPE
- The credentials of the authorizing entity in a public-key scheme - AUTH\_ENT\_ID X-TYPE
- Authentication data used to prevent tampering with the AUTH\_SESSION policy element - AUTHENTICATION\_DATA

Furthermore, the AUTH\_SESSION policy element MAY contain:

- The lifetime of (each of) the media stream(s) - END\_TIME X-TYPE
- Calling party port number - SOURCE\_ADDR X-TYPE
- Called party port number - DEST\_ADDR X-TYPE

All AUTH\_SESSION fields MUST match with the resource request. If a field does not match, the request SHOULD be denied.

## 6. Message Processing Rules

### 6.1 Generation of the AUTH\_SESSION by the authorizing entity

1. Generate the AUTH\_SESSION policy element with the appropriate contents as specified in section 5.
2. If authentication is needed, the entire AUTH\_SESSION policy element is constructed, excluding the length, type and subtype fields of the AUTH\_SESSION field. Note that the message MUST include either a START\_TIME or a SESSION\_ID (See Section 9), to prevent replay attacks. The output of the authentication algorithm, plus appropriate header information, is appended to the AUTH\_SESSION policy element.

### 6.2 Message Generation (RSVP Host)

An RSVP message is created as specified in [RFC-2205] with the following modifications.

1. RSVP message MUST contain at most one AUTH\_SESSION policy element.
2. The AUTH\_SESSION policy element received from the authorizing entity (Section 3.2) MUST be copied without modification into the POLICY\_DATA object.
3. POLICY\_DATA object (containing the AUTH\_SESSION policy element) is inserted in the RSVP message in the appropriate place.

### 6.3 Message Reception (RSVP-aware Router)

RSVP message is processed as specified in [RFC-2205] with following modifications.

1. If router is policy aware then it SHOULD send the RSVP message to the PDP and wait for response. If the router is policy unaware then it ignores the policy data objects and continues processing the RSVP message.

2. Reject the message if the response from the PDP is negative.
3. Continue processing the RSVP message.

#### 6.4 Authorization (Router/PDP)

1. Retrieve the AUTH\_SESSION policy element. Check the PE type field and return an error if the identity type is not supported.
2. Verify the message integrity.
  - Shared symmetric key authentication: The Network router/PDP uses the AUTH\_ENT\_ID field to consult a table keyed by that field. The table should identify the cryptographic authentication algorithm to be used along with the expected length of the authentication data and the shared symmetric key for the authorizing entity. Verify that the indicated length of the authentication data is consistent with the configured table entry and validate the authentication data.
  - Public Key: Validate the certificate chain against the trusted Certificate Authority (CA) and validate the message signature using the public key.
  - Kerberos Ticket: If the AUTH\_ENT\_ID is of subtype KRB\_PRINCIPAL, Request a ticket for the authorizing entity (principal@realm) from the local KDC. Use the ticket to access the authorizing entity and obtain authentication data for the message.
3. Once the identity of the authorizing entity and the validity of the service request has been established, the authorizing router/PDP MUST then consult its local policy tables (the contents of which are a local matter) in order to determine whether or not the specific request is authorized. To the extent to which these access control decisions require supplementary information, routers/PDPs MUST ensure that supplementary information is obtained securely. An example of insecure access control decisions would be if the authorizing party relies upon an insecure database (such as DNS or a public LDAP directory) and authorizes with a certificate or an FQDN.
4. Verify the requested resources do not exceed the authorized QoS.

## 7. Error Signaling

If a PDP fails to verify the AUTH\_SESSION policy element then it MUST return a policy control failure (Error Code = 02) to the PEP. The error values are described in [RFC-2205] and [RFC-2750]. Also the PDP SHOULD supply a policy data object containing an AUTH\_DATA Policy Element with A-Type=POLICY\_ERROR\_CODE containing more details on the Policy Control failure [RFC-3182]. If RSVP is being used, the PEP MUST include this Policy Data object in the outgoing RSVP Error message.

## 8. IANA Considerations

Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], Standard RSVP Policy Elements (P-type values) are assigned by IETF Consensus action as described in [RFC-2750].

P-Type AUTH\_SESSION is assigned the value 0x04.

Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], session authorization attribute types (X-Type) in the range 0-127 are allocated through an IETF Consensus action; X-Type values between 128-255 are reserved for Private Use and are not assigned by IANA.

X-Type AUTH\_ENT\_ID is assigned the value 1.  
X-Type SESSION\_ID is assigned the value 2.  
X-Type SOURCE\_ADDR is assigned the value 3.  
X-Type DEST\_ADDR is assigned the value 4.  
X-Type START\_TIME is assigned the value 5.  
X-Type END\_TIME is assigned the value 6.  
X-Type RESOURCES is assigned the value 7.  
X-Type AUTHENTICATION\_DATA is assigned the value 8.

Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], AUTH\_ENT\_ID SubType values in the range 0-127 are allocated through an IETF Consensus action; SubType values between 128-255 are reserved for Private Use and are not assigned by IANA.

AUTH\_ENT\_ID SubType IPV4\_ADDRESS is assigned the value 1.  
SubType IPV6\_ADDRESS is assigned the value 2.  
SubType FQDN is assigned the value 3.  
SubType ASCII\_DN is assigned the value 4.  
SubType UNICODE\_DN is assigned the value 5.  
SubType URI is assigned the value 6.  
SubType KRB\_PRINCIPAL is assigned the value 7.  
SubType X509\_V3\_CERT is assigned the value 8.  
SubType PGP\_CERT is assigned the value 9.

Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], SOURCE\_ADDR SubType values in the range 0-127 are allocated through an IETF Consensus action; SubType values between 128-255 are reserved for Private Use and are not assigned by IANA.

SOURCE\_ADDR SubType IPV4\_ADDRESS is assigned the value 1.  
SubType IPV6\_ADDRESS is assigned the value 2.  
SubType UDP\_PORT\_LIST is assigned the value 3.  
SubType TCP\_PORT\_LIST is assigned the value 4.

Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], DEST\_ADDR SubType values in the range 0-127 are allocated through an IETF Consensus action; SubType values between 128-255 are reserved for Private Use and are not assigned by IANA.

DEST\_ADDR SubType IPV4\_ADDRESS is assigned the value 1.  
SubType IPV6\_ADDRESS is assigned the value 2.  
SubType UDP\_PORT\_LIST is assigned the value 3.  
SubType TCP\_PORT\_LIST is assigned the value 4.

Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], START\_TIME SubType values in the range 0-127 are allocated through an IETF Consensus action; SubType values between 128-255 are reserved for Private Use and are not assigned by IANA.

START\_TIME SubType NTP\_TIMESTAMP is assigned the value 1.

Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], END\_TIME SubType values in the range 0-127 are allocated through an IETF Consensus action; SubType values between 128-255 are reserved for Private Use and are not assigned by IANA.

END\_TIME SubType NTP\_TIMESTAMP is assigned the value 1.

Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], RESOURCES SubType values in the range 0-127 are allocated through an IETF Consensus action; SubType values between 128-255 are reserved for Private Use and are not assigned by IANA.

RESOURCES SubType BANDWIDTH is assigned the value 1.  
SubType FLOW\_SPEC is assigned the value 2.  
SubType SDP is assigned the value 3.  
SubType DSCP is assigned the value 4.

## 9. Security Considerations

The purpose of this document is to describe a mechanism for session authorization to prevent theft of service.

Replay attacks MUST be prevented. In the non-associated model, the AUTH\_SESSION policy element MUST include a START\_TIME field and the Policy Servers MUST support NTP to ensure proper clock synchronization. Failure to ensure proper clock synchronization will allow replay attacks since the clocks of the different network entities may not be in-synch. The start time is used to verify that the request is not being replayed at a later time. In all other models, the SESSION\_ID is used by the Policy Server to ensure that the resource request successfully correlates with records of an authorized session. If a AUTH\_SESSION is replayed, it MUST be detected by the policy server (using internal algorithms) and the request MUST be rejected.

To ensure that the integrity of the policy element is preserved in untrusted environments, the AUTHENTICATION\_DATA attribute MUST be included.

In environments where shared symmetric keys are possible, they should be used in order to keep the AUTH\_SESSION policy element size to a strict minimum. This is especially true in wireless environments where the AUTH\_SESSION policy element is sent over-the-air. The shared symmetric keys authentication option MUST be supported by all AUTH\_SESSION implementations.

If shared symmetric keys are not a valid option, the Kerberos authentication mechanism is reasonably well secured and efficient in terms of AUTH\_SESSION size. The AUTH\_SESSION only needs to contain the principal@realm name of the authorizing entity. This is much more efficient than the PKI authentication option.

PKI authentication option provides a high level of security and good scalability, however it requires the presence of credentials in the AUTH\_SESSION policy element which impacts its size.

## 10. Acknowledgments

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